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Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 
Harrison Fell, Ian A. MacKenzie, and William A. Pizer 
1. Introduction 
Under the presence of uncertainty, welfare comparisons of regulatory instruments have 
typically focused on price versus temporally fixed quantity instruments.  Yet a common trend is 
for policies to allow regulated quantities to be banked–that is, tradable permits can either be 
saved for future use or possibly borrowed from future periods.  This is true for the majority of 
existing and proposed tradable permit markets.1 While the early motivation for banking 
provisions was to allow firms to smooth the transition to more stringent future limits through 
early reductions, more recent debates in the 110
th Congress focused on accommodating 
uncertainty and the risk of unexpectedly high costs.  Many argued that an expanded banking and 
borrowing system to regulate U.S. greenhouse gas emissions could alleviate concerns about 
uncertain costs in a manner similar to a price mechanism.2 
But can banking and borrowing provisions really accommodate cost shocks in a way that 
resembles a price mechanism? To answer this question, we develop a model of optimal firm 
behavior with a quantitative, periodic emission limit over an arbitrarily long horizon, the 
flexibility to bank (and possibly borrow within limits) allowances, and cost uncertainty that is 
                                                 
 Colorado School of  Mines, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, and Duke University, 
respectively. 
1 See http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/basic.html, http://www.rggi.org/, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm, and 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php (article 3, paragraph 13) for information on 
the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the EU ETS, and the Kyoto Protocol, 
respectively. 
2  See Murray et al (2009).  The reality of the policy debate in the U.S. is evidenced by the evolution of legislative 
proposals.  The first time cap-and-trade legislation was seriously proposed in 2003, it included a simple banking 
provision comparable to the sulfur dioxide trading program.  By the time legislation passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2009, it included borrowing provisions, a price floor, and a quantity-limited price ceiling. 3 
 
potentially correlated over time and never completely resolved.  We show banking allows shocks 
to be spread over time as long as the banking constraint is not expected to bind.  When the 
constraint is expected to bind, banking offers little practical flexibility.  This highlights an 
important connection between banking with and without uncertainty:  it is the banking behavior 
driven by deterministic features – what we could call deterministic banking – that creates the 
window for uncertain shocks to be spread efficiently over time.   
In order to quantify these effects and compare welfare outcomes with ordinary price and 
quantity controls, we must numerically solve for optimal firm banking behavior.  For plausible 
parameters related to U.S. climate change policy, we find bankable quantity regulation improves 
welfare over a non-bankable system, but does not achieve welfare improvements over a price 
policy, which represents an upper bound given exceedingly flat marginal benefits.  In the early 
years of the policy, when the banking constraint is not expected to bind for more than two 
decades, bankable quantities behave like prices in terms of emissions and welfare but gradually 
transition to behave like non-bankable quantity policies.  The welfare improvement over non-
bankable quantity policies averages about a billion dollars per year – more than 80 percent of the 
welfare improvement from prices – during the first twenty years but with little improvement 
thereafter.  While tighter banking constraints and higher discount rates reduce the ability to 
match the welfare associated with prices, looser banking constraints and lower correlation of cost 
shocks increase it.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing literature, highlighting 
the gap between discussions of welfare differences among policies and banking behavior with 
relevant constraints and information assumptions.  Section 3 introduces the banking problem and 4 
 
discusses the solution.  Section 4 outlines the benefit model and provides intuition about welfare 
effects.  Section 5 presents the numerical analysis, and Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Background and Existing Literature 
This paper draws from two important strands of the economics literature, one looking at 
the welfare differences among policy choices that differ under uncertainty about costs but are 
otherwise equivalent, and one looking at behavior (and sometimes welfare) associated with the 
ability to bank allowances in a more limited uncertainty environment.3  The first strand has 
developed a well-known distinction between price versus non-bankable quantity policies 
(Weitzman, 1974):the net welfare effect of prices over quantities hinges on the relative slopes of 
marginal costs and benefits.4 
Papers on banking first emerged after the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments created the 
SO2 trading program with an unlimited banking provision.  These studies ignored uncertainty 
and focused on how banking shifts emissions to the future to equalize otherwise unequal (and 
higher) discounted marginal costs in the future, lowering total discounted costs (e.g. Cronshaw 
and Kruse (1996), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), and Leiby and Rubin (2001)).  
Analysis of banking with uncertainty followed but has been relatively limited.  A number of 
authors suggested that banking can reduce permit price volatility in the face of uncertain cost 
shocks (e.g. Godby et al (1997), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), and Ellerman (2005)).  Yates and 
Cronshaw (2001), Yates (2002), and Feng and Zhao (2006) investigate when banking and 
                                                 
3 Uncertainty in both damage and abatement costs has also been considered. In particular, Stavins (1996) 
investigated correlated uncertainty between damage and abatement costs and found that in many cases quantity 
regulation was desirable. However, as our motivating application is global climate change, where the dominant 
sources of uncertainty are uncorrelated and marginal benefits exceeding flat, we do not focus on this aspect of the 
problem. 
4 These results were later extended by Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003) to consider stock 
externalities (pollutants). 5 
 
borrowing improve welfare, with results that support Weitzman’s original intuition about the 
importance of the relative slopes of marginal costs and benefits.  However, their models have 
quite stylized features – two time periods and no borrowing constraints –that make it difficult to 
assess real-world programs.   
Schennach (2000) is the first (and perhaps only) author to build a theoretical model with 
banking, banking constraints, multiple (even infinite) periods, and uncertainty, in order to study 
the U.S. SO2market.  She focuses on qualitatively understanding the optimal price and emissions 
paths (but not welfare) with and without cost uncertainty when emission targets feature a step-
wise decline.  Our analytical discussion of banking behavior draws heavily from her work.   
A study by Williams (2002) mirrors the welfare-focused spirit of our paper. Williams 
analyzes regulation under prices, quantities and tradable quantities and extends this framework to 
include banking and borrowing. An important contribution is his intuition that banking and 
borrowing effectively flatten marginal costs compared to earlier analyses that ignored banking 
and borrowing (Hoel & Karp, 2002; Newell & Pizer, 2003), consistent with our own results.  
However, while he goes on to draw a stronger conclusion that banking does not affect the 
expected benefits from stock pollutants, we relax a number of his assumptions (e.g., no 
constraints on negative banking) and are more equivocal, a point we return to below. 
Currently, there exists no welfare analysis of bankable quantities capturing both 
uncertainty about the future from the firms’ perspective as well as the regulators’ and constraints 
on banking (e.g., that borrowing is constrained in some way, to zero or to a small, limited 
amount). Our contribution, therefore, is to provide a more realistic model of banking behavior 
under uncertainty that lends itself to quantitative analysis, to develop a welfare framework for 
comparing that policy to fixed quantity and price policies, and to then use these tools to look at 6 
 
the choice among these policies for the particular problem of controlling greenhouse gas 
emission to address climate change. 
3.  The Banking Problem 
We begin by looking at how otherwise equivalent policies – prices, quantities, and 
quantity controls that allow banking – lead to different optimal emission and marginal cost 
behavior when uncertainty arises.  Ordinary price and quantity controls pose a relatively simple 
behavioral problem for the firm to solve and the regulator to understand.  Consider the quadratic 
cost function in Newell and Pizer (2003), hereafter NP (in turn, a multi-period extension of 
Weitzman (1974)):  
       ,                     
  
2
             (1)
The variable qt is the chosen emission level,     is the average, cost-minimizing level of emissions 
in the absence of regulation (i.e., the expected baseline or “uncontrolled” emissions level), ct > 0 
describes the slope of marginal costs, and θt is a current-period shock to marginal costs observed 
by firms (but not by the regulator).  Potential changes in ct and  t q  allow for cost reductions and 
growth in uncontrolled emissions over time. We view (1) as an aggregate, representative firm’s 
cost function arising from a competitive within-period emissions trading market (Rubin, 1996).5 
How do various policies differ in their emission and marginal cost outcomes?  First 
consider non-banking regulation.  In the case of quantity controls,   
 , the regulated firm actually 
                                                 
5 As shown in Rubin (1996) in a model without uncertainty, the decentralized firm behavior in a cap-and-trade 
program with banking leads to the same emission path as that of a cost-minimizing social planner. Under the 
assumption that all regulated firms have the same expectations about future shocks, we can therefore use a 
representative firm framework to describe aggregate behavior.  7 
 
faces no choice:  it simply emits the regulated volume of emissions, setting        
 .6  Marginal 
costs are given by 
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          (2)
Note that as we regulate to reduce emissions,   
       , so marginal costs of emissions are 
negative – which makes sense because emissions, qt, are a negative externality.  In the case of 
price controls (e.g., taxes),   
 , the firm will want to reduce emissions until marginal abatement 
costs (    /   ) equal the regulated price each period, solving   
                        for qt.  
Assuming the price policy is set to match the quantity policy in expectation, we can write the 
emission outcome under a price policy as: 
    ,           
   
 
  
       
  
  
    




The opportunity to bank (and borrow) emission allowances poses a trickier challenge for 
deriving optimal firm behavior.  To be specific, the regulator gives the firm a pre-specified 
emission allocation each period, which we label yt.  The firm also starts each period with a bank 
Bt of unused allowances from the end of the previous period.  The firm is free to use the sum of 
these allowances yt + Bt to cover emissions qt this period, but any leftover allowances can, in 
turn, be saved for use in future periods.  That is, 
                       (4)
becomes the starting point for next period’s emission decision.7  It may even be possible to leave 
a negative bank for the next period; generally, the firm is told that the start-of-period t+1 bank, 
                                                 
6 To be precise, the regulated firm can choose any        
 .Firms will choose        
  so long as costshocks are 
small compared to expected marginal costs, which is true in our eventual parameterization.  We adopt thegeneral 
assumption that        
 , consistent with Weitzman and NP, as it does not materially affect our results and simplifies 
exposition by allowingE        
 . 8 
 
Bt+1, must be equal to or greater than      , which is a constraint limiting the minimum level of  
banking (borrowing).  Here,       is typically zero but could be negative when a regulation allows 
limited borrowing.  The firm now has the flexibility of choosing emissions qt anywhere between 
0 and yt + Bt –       .  Finally, the firm needs to make an assumption about the evolution of cost 
shocks θt.  For simplicity, we assume a simple autoregressive model. 
We can summarize the firm’s optimization problem under a bankable quantity policy as 
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 (5)
where β = 1/(1+r) is the discount factor and Et[ ] is the expected value given all the information 
known at time t.  As noted, θt follows a stationary autoregressive process, with   ~  0,  
   and 
|ρ| ≤ 1.8  Given the ability to pick qt each period based on new information at time t, it makes 
sense to rewrite this problem (5) in the form of a Bellman equation, 
      ,      m i n
  ,    
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subject to
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7 A more general banking relationship would allow for non-unitary and even non-uniform trading ratio between 
periods, so Bt + 1 = Rt(Bt + yt – qt) and Rt( ) is some monotonically increasing function.  Assuming Rt(x) = x, as we do 
and consistent with actual emission trading programs, implies that whenever banking occurs, prices rise at the 
interest rate. 
8 The cost shock variance at time t, var(θt) is therefore given by var         
      
  1       / 1       , assuming 
that θt <0 = 0. 9 
 
The value function Vt(Bt,t) is defined recursively as the minimized expected net present value of 
costs, conditional on the current bank Bt and baseline cost shock t, and assuming similarly 
optimal behavior in every future period.  The solution to this problem (6), an optimal decision 
rule      ,    and        ,    , requires a numerical approach, to which we return in Section 5.  
However, as shown in the appendix, the necessary first-order conditions for the problem (6) are 
given by: 
                                (7)
                        (8)
where πt, μt, and γt, all ≥ 0, are the Lagrange multipliers on the allowance constraint (4), non-
negative emissions constraint, and the minimum bank constraint, respectively.9  While not 
revealing the exact solution path, these first-order conditions provide useful intuition about 
optimal banking behavior under uncertainty, particularly how banking can smooth out cost 
shocks and, as we will see in Section 4, affect welfare. 
First note that, from Equation (7), πt is the shadow price of allowances and equals the 
marginal abatement cost, so long as emissions are strictly positive and μt = 0.10   The Euler 
equation (8) displays the traditional Hotelling rule that expected allowance prices rise at discount 
rate r = (1/β) – 1 each period when the minimum bank constraint is not binding, e.g., when γt = 
0.11  That is, firms will try to minimize costs across periods t and t+1 by shifting emissions to 
equalize discounted marginal costs.  If they reach Bt+1         and discounted expected future 
                                                 
9 Note that we associate the Lagrange multiplier γt  with the constraint Bt+1       .  We chose this specification 
because the bank at the start of next period, Bt 1, is fully defined by the current state and the current emission 
decision in period t, making the Lagrange multiplier on the minimum bank constraint for next period a 
current period variable. 
10 Compare to Equation (9) in Rubin (1996), where his et and Λt are comparable to our qt and πt. 
11 Compare to Rubin (1996) Equation (22) or Schennach (2000) Equation (1). 10 
 
marginal costs are still lower than current marginal costs, they would prefer to bank even less 
than        for next period, but cannot.  In that case, γt > 0 in order to balance Equation (8). 
The preceding results have been described by Rubin (1996) and others for the case 
without uncertainty.  In particular, they distinguish those time intervals where the minimum bank 
constraint is not binding and discounted allowance prices are equalized over the interval, versus 
those time intervals where the minimum bank constraint is binding and discounted allowance 
prices are falling.  Schennach (2000) looks at this problem with uncertainty and describes a third 
type of interval that literally connects the other two.  That is, uncertainty implies transition 
periods where it is unknown today whether the constraint is binding or not.  Uncertainty tends to 
smear the exact point envisioned by Rubin where minimum bank constraint begins to bind and γt 
changes from zero to positive.  For example, the constraint might bind early if costs are 
unexpectedly high, or late if costs are unexpectedly low.   
These different types of banking intervals turn out to be important for our intuition about 
emissions, prices, and ultimately welfare outcomes, under different policies. In particular, we can 
look at how prices respond to shocks θt during different banking intervals and contrast it with 
behavior under price and non-bankable quantity policies.  Consider, for example, a perturbation 
δθt to a realized θt, and how the perturbation affects prices under different policies.  Under a price 
policy, prices are fixed and there is no price change.  Under a non-bankable quantity policy     
  
 , we can work out the perturbation in price based on (2) and the assumption that price is the 
negative marginal cost of emissions:  namely, δpt      
   
   
  = –δθt . 
  With banking, if we begin in a period where the minimum bank constraint is not binding, 
and we assume we know with certainty that the bank is constrained by Bt+s+1           beginning 
s periods in the future, but not before, we show in the appendix that 11 
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Here, δπt is the change in allowance price arising from δθt, ρ is the correlation among cost 
shocks, ct is the slope of marginal costs in period t, and β is the discount factor.  With no 
correlation, no discounting, and constant ct this simplifies to:12 
 
     
    
1  
  (10)
In other words, the price increase δθt is spread over however many periods the bank is 
unconstrained.  That is, optimal behavior considers this period of unconstrained banking to be a 
single pool of emission reduction effort, with any required increase or decrease in effort spread 
evenly throughout the pool.  If the unconstrained interval is quite long (e.g., s approaches 
infinity, as in Newell, Pizer, and Zhang (2005)), the price increase is spread so thinly so as to be 
imperceptible and behavior will be very similar to a price policy.   
On the other hand, with perfect auto-correlation and no discounting (9) simplifies to ∂πt = 
–∂θt. In this case, there is no reason to spread the cost shock because we now expect future cost 
shocks to be the same as today; behavior will be very similar to a non-bankable quantity policy.  
This behavioral difference between high and low correlation cost shocks is analogous to the 
difference between of high and low correlation income shocks for the resulting effect on 
consumption (Friedman, 1957).   
Even without autocorrelation, if s is zero and we are instead in an interval where banking 
is constrained, there is little flexibility to spread the price increase δθt and behavior will be very 
similar to a non-bankable quantity policy.  It will not be exactly the same because it is always 
                                                 
12 This is implied by equation (13) in Schennach (2000) though it is not discussed. 12 
 
possible that a particularly favorable shock will spontaneously create a brief period of banking (a 
point ignored in (9-10) by the simplifying assumption that s is known and fixed).  That is, a 
favorable cost shock creates a bounty of unexpected cost savings that can be used today or 
spread over several periods.  When discounted marginal costs are lower in the future, as occurs 
when banking is constrained, the discounted cost savings from spreading this bounty to the 
future will generally be less than using it all today.  However, if the bounty is large and today’s 
marginal cost is otherwise depressed by a favorable cost shock below the discounted value of 
future marginal costs, it will make sense to bank some of it for the future. 
This leads us to the following summary of banking behavior under uncertainty: 
When deterministic trends in baseline emissions, allowance allocation, and costs lead to 
a period of certain banking activity unrelated to cost shocks and where we do not expect the 
minimum bank constraint to bind, bankable quantities under uncertainty lead to behavior that is 
similar to price regulation so long as the end of this period is sufficiently far in the future.  
During periods when we do expect the minimum bank constraint is expected to bind, bankable 
quantities lead to behavior that is similar to non-bankable quantity regulation.  As we approach 
the end of a period of unconstrained banking, outcomes under bankable quantity policies will 
transition from price-like to non-bankable-quantity-like behavior. 
  Much of this discussion and the expression (9) assume firms always know the exact 
future moment t+s+1 when the minimum bank constraint becomes binding, ignoring the 
uncertain transition interval created by cost uncertainty.  This creates ambiguity about exactly 
what is meant by “the end of a period of unconstrained banking” and makes it impossible to 
derive analytically exactly how prices,πt, respond to cost shocks.  While we expect the 
aforementioned intuition will continue to hold, we must ultimately turn to numerical analyses to 13 
 
quantify the results, which we do after rounding out our model of costs and firm behavior with a 
model of pollution impacts, mitigation benefits, and welfare. 
4. Welfare 
So far we have focused on mitigation costs and how different price, quantity, and 
bankable quantity policies lead to different emission and marginal cost outcomes in the face of 
uncertain cost shocks.  To understand the welfare consequences of these outcomes, we need to 
add a model of mitigation benefits and evaluate the expected net benefits across alternative 
policies.  We continue to use the basic framework in NP to do this. 
First, we allow for emissions to accumulate in the environment   
  1 (1 ) tt t SS q     (11)
where St is the accumulated stock of emissions at time t, which accumulates with decay rate .  
The decay rate can take on values representing cases ranging from a “pure stock externality” that 
persists forever ( = 0) to a “flow externality” ( = 1) that replicates the traditionally analyzed 
case.  “Benefits” associated with the stock of emissions are then given by 





B SS S     (12)
where t S  represents a benefit maximizing level of the stock (possibly zero, possibly a 
background level) and bt ≥ 0.  The latter assumption implies that pollution in excess of    faces 
increasing marginal damages (e.g., increasingly negative marginal benefits).  
  The above relations (11-12) and results from the previous section are sufficient to solve 
the firm’s cost-minimization problem numerically, simulate outcomes under uncertainty, and 
compute expected net benefits under bankable quantities and alternate policies.  However, we 
can also use the model to derive more refined expressions for comparing welfare that provide 14 
 
intuition for our results.  In the spirit of Weitzman (1974) and NP, we can derive the welfare 
difference Δt between alternate policies and a benchmark of non-bankable quantity controls in a 
given period t.  That is, we can derive an expression for  
  Δ 
  = E0[NBt,policy x] – E[NBt,quantity],  (13)
where E[NBt,policy x] is the expected net benefits under policy x – price controls or a system of 
bankable permits in our case – in period t, and E[NBt,quantity] is the expected net benefits of a 
(non-bankable) quantity policy in period t.  Here, the quantity control is set at the same emission 
level as the expected emissions under policy x.13 
As we show in the appendix, we can use our model of costs and benefits to write  
 
Δ 




       1  
var    
  
         
var    
  
    
  ⁄
   (14)
where var(pt) and var(St) are the variance in allowance prices and the accumulated emission 
stock, respectively, under policy x.  To understand this expression, first note that aside from the 
time subscripts and factors multiplying ct and bt, Equation (14) appears remarkably similar to 
Weitzman’s (1974) expression comparing welfare under alternate price and quantity controls in a 




2           (15)
The intuition in his simpler model and policy scenarios is straightforward: prices offer a cost 
savings over quantities, given by  1/2        ⁄   , by trading off high marginal cost emissions 
for low marginal cost emissions in different states of the world.  This goes along with a loss in 
                                                 
13Note that in a comparison of bankable to non-bankable quantity policies, fixing non-bankable quantities at the 
expected emission level E0[qt] will not be the same as fixing them at the allocation level yt.  Fixing emissions at the 
allocation level would conflate advantages of banking unrelated to uncertainty. 15 
 
expected benefits associated with prices,   1/2        ⁄   , stemming from the induced variance 
in quantities coupled with concave benefits.   
Second, our more general model reduces to Weitzman’s result when policy x represents 
price regulation and we consider a flow pollutant where St = qt.  In this case by construction 
var(pt) = 0 and, from (3) and the assumption that St = qt, we have var(St) = var(qt) and var(qt) = 
  
    
  ⁄ .  That is, the Weitzman price-versus-quantity welfare comparison is a special case of (14). 
  More generally, these factors multiplying ct and bt in Equation (14) provide intuition 
about how expected costs and benefits change based on a more general set of policies.  The first 
factor shows that cost savings relative to a non-bankable quantity policy has everything to do 
with reducing price (or marginal cost) variance under a given emission response function.  Price 
variance represents missed opportunities to trade off high price emission reductions for low price 
emission reductions while maintaining the same expected emission level.  Under a quantity 
policy, var(pt) =   
  based on (2) and there is no cost savings by construction.  Under a price 
policy, var(pt) = 0  and cost savings is maximized.  Other reasonable policies will generally fall 
somewhere in between.   
The second factor shows that benefit losses relative to a non-bankable quantity policy are 
related to variance in the accumulated pollution stock, which is in turn driven by variance in 
emissions.  Under a quantity policy, var(St) = var(qt) = 0 and there is no benefit loss by 
construction.  Under a price policy, var(qt) =   
 /  
  based on (3). However, except in the case of 
a flow pollutant, where var(St) = var(qt), translating this emission variation into accumulated 
stock variation is non-trivial.  Calculating var(St) is even more problematic under bankable 
quantities, where emissions are path-, as well as shock-, dependent and must be numerically 
derived.  While we know there is a benefit loss from policies that introduce emissions 16 
 
uncertainty compared to a regulation that fixes the emission path, ultimately a numerical analysis 
is required to quantify this loss. 
We note these results generally are consistent with Williams (2002), who concludes that 
banking and borrowing effectively reduce the slope of marginal costs when comparing prices 
and quantities and offer welfare improvements over non-bankable quantity controls for stock 
pollutants.  His interpretation of flatter marginal costs when comparing prices to bankable rather 
than non-bankable quantities is consistent with our factor (<1) multiplying ct term in (14).14 
Going further, certain assumptions in his analysis eliminate (or minimize) the loss of expected 
benefits under bankable versus non-bankable quantities for a stock pollutant.  In our approach, 
we relax his assumptions (e.g., no banking constraint, a fixed banking horizon, no correlation of 
shocks, full knowledge of all shocks in all periods) and leave to a numerical analysis a 
determination about the magnitude of expected benefit loss, a task to which we now turn. 
5. Numerical  Analysis 
To parameterize the problem, we consider sets of values related to an emissions control 
policy implemented in the U.S.  This allows us to answer the question of whether banking 
significantly reduce price volatility, and consequently expected costs, in an immediately relevant 
context.15  Table 1 presents our benchmark parameter values, where cost-related parameters are 
based largely on recent estimates of U.S. compliance costs with H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey) 
given in (EPA, 2009) and benefit-related parameters derive from NP.  Additional detail on the 
rationale and data sources can be found in the appendix.   
                                                 
14 The ct term in a price-to-bankable-quantity comparison, Δ 
price  Δ  
bankable  , would be (var(pt)/σ
2)ct, where var(pt) 
<σ
2 would be measured for bankable quantitites.  In that sense, the effective marginal cost slope, e.g., the entire ct 
term including the pre-multiplying factor, is flatter for the price-to-bankable-quantity comparison versus the 
effective marginal cost slope in a price-to-non-bankable quantity comparison (ct). 
15 For reference, we also compare our results to those in NP who consider a global policy in footnote 20. 17 
 
The numerical approach is relatively straightforward:  we take a finite-horizon 
approximation to (5), discretize the state space in (6), and solve backwards from a final period 
for the value function Vt(Bt, θt) and optimal decision rule qt(Bt, θt) or Bt+1(Bt, θt) each period.16  
For this application, we allow both the shock state variable θt and the bank state variable Bt to 
take on 201 discrete values. Thus, a 201 201 grid can fully describe the range of possible states 
at any given period. Given the discretized shocks and the assumed autoregressive process for the 
shocks, we can also derive a transition probability matrix, P, that describes the probability of 
moving from any of the 201 θt values to each θt+1 value. We consider a terminal period at T = 51, 
allowing us to consider behavior through 2050 without endpoint effects.17 
With a chosen horizon T, we can easily find the optimal rule for qT(BT, θT) and value 
function VT(BT, θT) in the final period T, for all possible 201×201 states.  We assume the terminal 
conditions that BT+1≥ 0, which implies that the representative firm must settle all outstanding 
allowance debts by the end of the finite horizon, and that VT+1(BT+1, θT+1) = 0. For a given bank 
BT at the beginning of period T, the problem in period T then simplifies to a fixed quantity 
problem with an allocation of BT + yT that the firm can either use in period T or discard. Solving 
this problem yields the function VT(BT,θT); we can then recursively solve the problem of finding 
the optimal q(Bt,θt) and V(Bt,θt)functions going from period T – 1back to 0 using (6). 
The end result of this backward recursion process gives us T, 201×201 matrices of 
optimal qt values for each possible (Bt, θt)state in each time period (i.e., the optimal policy rules).  
Given the optimal qt matrices and starting bank B0 (=0), we can then run simulations given a set 
of generated θ values.  Each iteration provides a different realization of the shock series θ1,…,θT, 
                                                 
16 Discretizing the bank state variable implicitly discretizes the control variable, or vice versa, given the bank 
transition equation (4).   
17 None of our results through 2050 change when instead use T = 101 or when we switch to a gridsize of 301 × 301. 18 
 
which we use to simulate the emission level qt(from our optimal q matrices), bank Bt+1 (based on 
(4)), and accumulated stock St (based on (11)), period by period.  Assuming emission allowance 
prices equal marginal abatement costs (i.e., a competitive allowance market), prices are 
calculated using equation (2) evaluated at the chosen emission level qt with banking. 
We use this procedure to forward simulate banking behavior over 10,000 random 
realizations of the cost shocks.  This yields a distribution of 10,000 emission levels, bank levels, 
prices, and pollution stocks in each period, which we can use to compute var(St) and var(pt). We 
then use these measures to calculate welfare differences for banking compared to non-bankable 
quantities given in (14).18Welfare differences Δt for multiple years t are then discounted and 
added together to calculate expected welfare differences over various horizons.  
The results are summarized in Table 2.19From earlier work by NP and others, we know 
that marginal benefits are exceedingly flat for greenhouse gas emissions, so prices are close to 
the first-best optimum.  We therefore start with prices versus non-bankable quantities in column 
2  as a benchmark.  That column closely replicates NP and reminds us the prices are 
unambiguously better than non-bankable quantities.20The third column provides our central 
estimates for the welfare gains from banking versus non-bankable quantities, which range from 
under a billion dollars for one year to over $15 billion for 20years.  Column 4 expresses this gain 
                                                 
18 A similar procedure can be used to simulate the welfare advantage of price policies compared to non-bankable 
quantities, replacing the recursively solved function qt(Bt, θt) with equation (3) in the simulation procedure. 
19 These welfare comparisons are based on price and non-bankable quantity policies determined by the expected 
price and emission paths associated with the bankable quantity policy.  In this way, the comparison is among 
policies with the same expected outcomes. 
20 NP report welfare gains for prices versus fixed quantities of 0.52, 4.6, 11, 21, and 35 billion dollars, respectively, 
over the 1, 5, 10, 20, and 40 year horizons.  While our estimates for prices versus fixed quantities are quite similar, 
they reflect cost shocks that are roughly one-third smaller and a marginal cost slope that is roughly ten times larger – 
differences that cancel out in Equation (1).  These differences reflect not only global versus U.S. cost functions but 
also different data sources.  For both marginal cost slopes and cost shock magnitudes, we use EPA (2009) while NP 
use Weyant and Hill (1999). 19 
 
as a share of the (essentially first-best) welfare gain from prices, and we see that bankable 
quantities in the U.S. achieve almost all of those welfare gains in the early periods of the 
regulation.  However, the relative advantage of bankable quantities stops growing after 20 years 
and prices begin to look much better.  Why?   
As described above, when deterministic trends in baseline emissions, allocation, and 
costs create a long period of certain banking activity, bankable quantity policies lead to behavior 
much like a price policy when the banking constraint remains far in the future; e.g., based on 
(10) and a large horizon s, cost shocks δθt do not translate into significant price changes δπt .  
However, as time passes the expected horizon to the banking constraints falls; in cases with more 
adverse shocks it falls more quickly and in cases with more favorable shocks it falls more 
slowly. With a small s in (10), costs shocks translate more directly into price changes and a 
bankable-quantity policy looks more like a non-bankable quantity policy.  
To better understand the relationship between the banking constraint and welfare, it is 
useful to look at the path of relevant variables over time.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how the 
banking constraints become binding over time.  Figure 1 shows the banking path (both the 
median value and 95 percent simulation intervals) while Figure 2 shows the probability that the 
banking constraint is binding.  Both reflect a large amount of certain banking through 2030 
driven by the deterministic trends in baseline emissions, allocations, and costs, which would 
arise even without uncertainty.  By 2030, both figures indicate that the banking constraint begins 
to bind with an observable probability even though it still does not bind with certainty by the end 
of our reporting horizon in 2050.  This wide range of possible endpoints for the initial banking 
period sharply contrasts with the Williams (2002) assumption that the endpoint is known with 20 
 
certainty and is qualitatively different from Schennach (2000), where the transition interval is 
relatively short. 
Of particular interest to us, the effectiveness of banking as a cost control (and welfare 
improving) mechanism begins to diminish long before the initial probability of a banking 
constraint arises in 2030.  As the horizon to 2030 becomes too short to adequately smooth out 
shocks based on (9), particularly given the high autocorrelation in the benchmark scenario (ρ = 
0.8), price variance increases.  This can be seen clearly in Figure 3, showing the path of 
allowances prices (both the mean and 95 percent simulation intervals).  Allowance price 
volatility under bankable quantities starts very small but increases steadily through 2035, by 
which point it matches the variability under non-bankable quantities.  Thus, expected gains from 
a bankable quantity policy relative to a non-bankable quantity policy diminish as we look over 
longer horizons because in later periods the bankable quantity policy begins to resemble the non-
bankable quantity policy.  This explains the results from Table 2, where most welfare gains arise 
in the first 10 years and none arise after 20 years. 
Sensitivity analysis in Table 3 confirms this intuition and provides additional insight into 
what happens under a banking policy.  The first row repeats the 20-year results from Table 2, 
labeled “benchmark,” followed by simulation results with the noted parameter changes.  All 
other parameters are otherwise the same as the benchmark. The second row of the table, labeled 
“double shocks”, shows that doubling the standard deviation of cost shocks roughly quadruples 
the welfare gain of both prices and banking over non-bankable quantities (as we would expect 
from (14)) with little relative change between prices and banking.  For the “high discount rate” 
case, where the discount rate is increased to 7%, there is a significant drop in the welfare 
advantage of both prices and banking, as the net present value of the same Δ 
  each period 21 
 
declines.  However, the banking advantage over non-bankable quantities declines more 
(indicated by the lower ratio of banking gain / price gain).  Higher discount rates reduce 
deterministic banking because the future is valued less.  This means that the horizon for 
unconstrained banking shrinks, and, consequently, the flexibility and ultimate welfare advantage 
gained through a bankable versus non-bankable quantity policy diminishes.  
In the “flat allocation path” scenario we completely eliminate deterministic banking by 
setting it = 2.84 billion tons for all t (which has the same cumulative allocation and emissions as 
the benchmark; compare to the benchmark initial allocations of 6 billion tons declining by -3.4 
percent, given in Table 1). With such a low initial allocation, there is no banking absent 
uncertainty; prices start at over $35 per ton and then rise at less than 1 percent per year.21  The 
firm would desperately prefer to do less abatement now and more in the future, but cannot do so 
because of the borrowing constraint.  Even with uncertainty, there is little banking.  Favorable 
shocks have to drive down prices by more than 20 percent in order to encourage spontaneous 
banking, which is unlikely because the shocks’ standard deviation is barely 10 percent of the 
initial price.22  Correspondingly, the bankable-quantity policy offers little benefit over a fixed-
quantity policy. 
While the high discount rate and flat allocation cases show why banking performance 
might decline, the last two highlight why it might improve.  In the case where we relax the 
                                                 
21 Initial abatement is 3.16 billion tons and the initial price is $36 per ton.  Prices then grow at the growth rate of 
abatement.  Given abatement equals  t q − yt, yt is constant, and  t q grows at 0.35 percent, the growth rate of 
abatement is 0.35 percent divided by abatement, which begins at slightly more the 50 percent and grows.  Hence 
prices start growing at 0.70 percent and decline over time to 0.35 percent.   
22 A favorable shock that drove down current prices by 20 percent would also drive down expected prices next 
period by 16 percent, based on the correlation of 0.8.  The improved expected return to banking of 20 – 16 = 4 
percent, on top of the original expected return of about 1 percent, would just match the discount rate.  More 
favorable shocks would offer a return to banking in excess of the discount rate, and therefore banking would occur.  
This would improve welfare compared to fixed quantities, but only in these limited states where large favorable 
shocks occur. 22 
 
borrowing constraint to        = -4yt+1 , four times the annual allowance allocation, the probability 
of a binding borrowing constraint decreases and the bankable-quantity policy mimics the price 
policy for a much longer period of time. The advantage of a bankable-quantity policy under this 
relaxed borrowing constraint therefore increases relative to the benchmark almost matching the 
price policy and similar to the results discussed in Newell, Pfizer, and Zhang (2005). In the last 
row, we consider a no correlation case (ρ = 0) and see that bankable quantities now nearly match 
prices. Absent correlation, it is considerably easier to accommodate shocks with banking because 
shocks are unlikely to build on one another.  This was pointed out analytically in equation (9) 
where lower correlation reduces deviations in prices for a given cost shock and time horizon.   
Summarizing, our results and sensitivity analysis support the intuition provided at the end 
of Section 3:  banking (and borrowing) provides the flexibility to spread cost shocks over time, 
to emit less and save allowances when costs are low, consequently emitting more and using 
banked allowance when costs are high.  However, the value of this flexibility depends on the 
horizon over which banking is already occurring unrelated to uncertainty, and shifting emissions 
over time is costless.  Such banking arises due to expected trends in baseline emissions, 
allocations, and costs – what we call deterministic banking.  Without deterministic banking, 
when the banking constraint is binding, it is impossible to borrow allowances in the face of an 
adverse shock and, even with a favorable shock, the amount of cost savings today typically does 
not make it prudent to save allowances for the future (unless the shock is particularly large).  
Higher discounting and lower initial allocations all bring forward the likely time when 
deterministic banking will end and the banking constraint will bind, lowering the benefits of 
banking relative to fixed quantities.  Looser borrowing constraints clearly delay the onset of the 23 
 
banking constraint, while lower correlation makes it easier to accommodate shocks for a given 
banking horizon.   
6. Conclusion 
Welfare comparisons between otherwise equivalent price and quantity instruments have 
long emphasized a basic difference.  Price instruments accommodate cost shocks and maintain 
fixed prices; quantity instruments provide no such accommodation and maintain fixed quantities.  
Yet most real quantity-based policies provide flexibility not accounted for in this dichotomy, 
namely the ability to bank (and sometimes borrow) against a multi-period quantitative constraint.  
For example, the ability to over-comply with a tradable permit system and bank unused 
allowances for future use is a central part of most observed emission trading systems.  
Intuitively, this banking flexibility should lead otherwise fixed quantities to behave more like 
prices. 
While many papers have looked at banking behavior as a way to smooth deterministic 
costs over time, few have looked at banking behavior as a way to smooth uncertain costs.  Those 
papers that have looked at banking under uncertainty did not focus on welfare, did not consider 
uncertainty about the future from the vantage point of the firm, and/or did not consider the 
typical banking constraint (that borrowing is limited).  These features are important if we are 
interested in a normative analysis of realistic policies over a horizon where firms as well as 
regulators have incomplete information.   
Our results confirm the intuition that optimizing firms would use banking to spread cost 
shocks over time, lowering costs compared to fixed quantities.  However, this tendency is limited 
to periods where deterministic banking arises and by the horizon before which the banking 
constraint is likely to bind.  Once the banking constraint is binding, adverse shocks cannot be 24 
 
accommodated and even favorable shocks are unlikely to lead firms to save allowances unless 
the shock is sufficient to reduce today’s marginal cost below expected future discounted 
marginal costs (which are typically much lower than today’s marginal costs when banking is 
constrained).  Based on the exceedingly flat marginal benefits associated with climate change 
policies, we know that price policies represent a limit on how much costs can be lowered from 
this kind of emission shifting, and the question remains: how much can banking match the 
performance of price policies? 
Parameterizing our model based on recent U.S. cap-and-trade proposals, we find banking 
improves welfare by about $1 billion per year compared to fixed quantities over a 20-year 
horizon, but subsequently banking constraints imply no further gains.  In relative terms, banking 
achieves over 95 percent of the price advantage over the initial decade, and over 80 percent over 
the first two decades.  More expansive borrowing provisions can extend the banking gains, as 
would lower correlation among cost shocks.  Higher discount rates and lower initial allocations 
(or more restrictive borrowing), however, would all reduce the banking gains. 
Given the observation that such policies frequently remain fixed for a decade or two at 
the most, limiting the relevant horizon for welfare comparisons, these results provide strong 
evidence that bankable quantity policies to address climate change can provide the bulk of the 
welfare advantages previously afforded to price policies.  Still, a number of interesting areas 
remain for further work.  Importantly, this analysis has not examined how the likelihood of 
policy adjustments might affect both banking behavior and the welfare analysis.  Recent changes 
in the regulation of sulfur dioxide, for example, suggest potential advantages and disadvantages 
from banking in the face of policy changes.  In addition, while we have sought to understand 25 
 
how banking ought to proceed, it remains for future work to more carefully compare these 
predictions to observed behavior. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Parameter Values 
Parameter Value 
Discount rate (r) 5.0% 
Marginal cost slope (ct)  12 x 10
-9 $/ton
2 
Cost uncertainty (  4 $/ton  
Correlation of shocks (  0.8 
Initial emissions ( 1 q )  6 billion tons 
Baseline emissions growth ( q g )  0.35% 
Initial allocation (y1)  6 billion tons 
Allocation growth (gy) -3.4  % 
Borrowing Limit (      )  -yt+1 
Marginal benefit slope (b1)  5.6 x 10
-13 $/ton
2 
Benefit growth rate (gb) 2.5%
Note: $ refers to 2005 US dollars and tons refers to metric tons of carbon dioxide. 
 
 
Table 2: Relative Welfare Advantages over Fixed Quantity Policy  
Policy Horizon  Price  Bankable Q  Banking gain/Price gain 
1 0.67  0.66  0.98 
5 5.7  5.6  0.98 
10 12  11  0.96 
20 21  17  0.83 
40 29  17  0.58 
Notes: Welfare advantages are the discounted expected cost differences between the policy 
listed and a pure quantity policy over given policy horizon. Welfare advantages are in billions 
of 2005 US dollars. Banking results are based on 10,000 simulations. 
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Table 3: 20-year Relative Welfare Advantages over Fixed Quantity – Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity  Price  Bankable Q  Banking gain/Price gain 
Benchmark 21  17  0.83 
Double shocks  83  67  0.80 
High Discount Rate
  17 12  0.71 
Flat Allocation Path  21  2.6  0.12 
Unlimited Borrowing  21  19  0.93 
No Correlation
  8.6 8.4  0.97 
Notes: Welfare advantages are given at a 20-year policy horizon. Welfare advantages are in 
billions of 2005 US dollars. Banking results based on 10,000 simulations. All parameters at 
benchmark levels unless otherwise noted. Double shocks sets the cost uncertainty () equal to 
$8/ton.  High Discount Rate sets r = 0.075.  Flat allocation path sets yt = 2.84 billion tons for all t. 
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We start by augmenting the Bellman equation (6) with the specified optimization constraints: 
 
     ,      m i n
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                           ,       
                                                  
  (A.1) 
Here, β = 1/(1+r) is the discount factor, Et is the expectations operator given information at time 
t, and πt, μt, and γt, all ≥ 0, are Lagrange multipliers on the allowance constraint (4), non-negative 
emissions constraint, and the next-period minimum bank constraint, respectively.23  The first-
order conditions are then: 
                                (A.2)
 
      
           ,      
     
            (A.3)
In addition the constraints noted in (6), we have the complementarity conditions       0   and 
                  0 .  Given the envelope condition result that          ⁄       , Equation (A.3) 
can be rewritten as the following Euler equation: 
                        (A.4)
Derivation of price response to δθt with active banking for s periods 
  With banking active for s periods, but not longer, small quantity adjustments δqt+j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 









   
                                                 
23 See Section 3 and Appendix D of (Schennach, 2000) for further discussion.  Her model is similar to ours 
(compare her Equation (16) with m and λ to our Equation (A.4) with π and γ) but her discussion is focused on the 
expected path rather than uncertainty and welfare. 34 
 
That is, the cumulative change must be zero.  From Equation (2) we know that 
         
   
   
                  and                               for s ≥ j≥ 1.  Solving for 
δqt+j and substituting into the above expression, 
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Using equation (A.4), we can recursively solve for                   or                  .  
Substituting again into the above expression, 
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Rearranging, 
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Derivation of the relative advantage expression Δ 
  in (14) 
As noted in the text, the general policy x-quantity welfare difference Δ 
  can be 
decomposed into effects on expected costs and effects on expected benefits.  That is, Equation 
(13) can be rewritten: 
  Δ 
  = E[NBt,policyx] – E[NBt,quantity] = (Bt,policyx – Bt,quantity) – (Ct,policyx – Ct,quantity)    (A.8)
Starting with the change in expected costs, if we rewrite the cost function by completing the 
square, we can express the cost function as 
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where equilibrium price pt is defined by marginal abatement costs, – tt Cq   , and the second 
line recognizes the squared expression in the first line as –pt/ct.     Taking expectations and 
subtracting the case where tt qq
   to determine cost savings relative to non-bankable quantities 
in (A.8), we have 
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t  = var(θt) is the variation in prices under non-bankable quantities, and var(pt) is the 
variation in prices observed under a mean preserving alternative, policy x.24  Note that by 
constructing a mean preserving alternative x,                                       
         , a 
result we used to simplify the final result:  
 




      
var    
  
   1     (A.13)
Turning to the benefit expression in (A.8), we note that        under policy x equals 
     
  , based on the linear stock accumulation (11) coupled with the assumption that policy x is 
a mean preserving alternative to   
 .  Therefore,  
                                                 
24 Note that the abatement cost function does not include adjustment costs. The inclusion of such costs would reduce 
the abatement cost advantage flexible quantity policies have over fixed quantity policies.    36 
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All of this leads to the generalized form given in (14):
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    (A.15)
where var(pt) and var(qt) are measured for any mean-preserving alternative to non-bankable 
quantities and which simplifies back to (15) when             
        ,  (/) tt t t qq c 
  , δ = 1, 
and St = qt under a price policy for a flow pollutant.   
Parameterization 
Our cost parameterization is based on recent estimates of U.S. compliance costs with 
H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey) given in (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2009).  
In particular, we assume initial baseline emissions, 1 q , of 6 billion tons CO2e and initial 
allocation of allowances, y1, of 6 billion tons, with  t q growing at 0.35% per year ( q g 0.0035) 
and yt declining at 3.4% per year (gy = -0.034). This parameterization is roughly in line with 
regulated abatement path of H.R. 2454 considered in EPA (2009).  Given this allocation path and 
baseline emissions path, we parameterize c1 such that P1  $13 per ton CO2underbankable 
quantities, the initial price estimate given in EPA (2009).25  This leads to c1 = $12 per ton per 
billion tons, or $12 x 10
-9 $/ton
2.  We assume an initial standard error for cost shocks, σ0, of $4 
per ton CO2 based on the reported variation in EPA scenarios,26 and a correlation of 0.8 based on 
                                                 
25 See slide 14 of (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2009) for initial allowance price estimates.   
26 See slide 12 of EPA (2009) for sensitivity analyses. 37 
 
NP.  Consistent with Waxman-Markey, we assume that firms can costlessly borrow from the 
next period’s allocation, thus we set        = –yt+1.27 
On the benefit side, we start with the NP estimate of b1, 8.7 x 10
-13 $/ton
2 and multiply by 
0.64 to convert from a price of retained CO2 to a price of emittedCO2.28  This allows easier 
comparison with conventional cost analyses based on emissions, such as EPA (2009), but 
requires an adjustment to compare with the original NP results.  As in NP, we assume these 







                                                 
27 The Waxman-Markey legislation allows for borrowing from allocations beyond the next period’s allocation,but 
an eight percent interest charge is assessed to these borrowed allowances. Such a steep borrowing charge makes 
borrowing from allocations beyond next year’s allocation highly unlikely (see the “flat allocation path” sensitivity 
analysis). Thus, we omit this type of borrowing from our analysis.   
28 Roughly 36 percent of CO2 emissions decay within one year; see appendix B in Newell and Pizer (1999). 